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The model presented in this paper is a particular case of  the principal-agent  problem.  An 
entrepreneur has an investment  project  whose returns depend on his effort, which  is not 
observable by the financier.  After determining the optimal contract that is used to finance 
such a project, I show that this contract can be replicated by a unique combination of debt 
and equity, which proves the op timality of  these financial instlwments. 
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The security design literature has made important progress in the development of  models 
in which debt is an optimal contract.  Some have used an agency cost argument, as happens 
in  Townsend  (1979), Diamond  (1984),  and  Gale and Hellwig  (1985); others have  used  a 
principal-agent  model, as happens in Hart and Moore (1989); and still others have used an 
adverse selection argument, as happens in Allen and Gale (1992).  Important progress has 
also been made in the development of models in which equity is an optimal contract. Here, 
the most frequent explanation adopted has been corporate control, as happens in Grossman 
and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988). 
Some of  these models-particularly  those that show  the optimality  of  debt using  an 
agency cost argument-have  become very popular for studying problems that involve the 
financial  sector of  the economy because  of  their flexibility and simplicity.  However, the 
lack of  an identical model in  which  both debt and equity are optimal contracts has made 
it difficult to address other issues, such as the implications of  regulations that limit banks' 
investments in  equity  or  whether  these investments should be regulated  differently from 
banks'  loans,  and  identification  of  the advantages of  different  banking  structures.  The 
importance of these questions has increased with the advent of universal banking structures 
in the European Community countries and with the ongoing discussion about the repeal of 
the Glass-Steagall  Act in the United States. 
There have been some attempts to derive the simultaneous optimality of debt and equity 
contracts, such as Chang (1987) and Williams (1989), but they are not without problems. 
Both use the same idea as Townsend (1979): Contracts cannot depend directly on the value 
of the firm's  assets.  In  addition, these studies also assume that  there exists in the firm 
one asset  or part of  its return that can be allocated to outsiders through a contract.  In 
both cases,  they  claim  that the optimal contract can be replicated  by  a  combination of 
debt and equity. In fact, their optimal contracts have some similarities with these financial 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9505.pdfinstruments, but the correspondence  is  not perfect.  For example, in  Chang's  paper, the 
manager is  the residual  claimant  of  the firm  instead of  the equityholders.  In Williams' 
model,  the problem  is  that the face  value  of  debt  he  uses  to compute  the payment  to 
equityholders is different from the payment made to debtholders. 
It is beyond the scope of  this paper to present a general theory that explains the opti- 
mality of  debt and equity contracts.  Instead, the goal is to develop a model in which these 
instruments are optimal, and with a structure flexible enough to be incorporated in  more 
general frameworks in order to address issues related  to these c0ntracts.l  This is accom- 
plished using the following principle:  If  it is possible to reduce the number of  variables that 
a manager can control  to a space of  dimension two then, in general, it  will be possible to 
implement the second-best  outcome through a combination of two financial instr~rnents.~ 
This principle is considered in a principal-agent  model where the agent has an investment 
project that produces an outcome in  three states of  nature. The moral hazard is generated 
by the dependence of  the investment return in each state on  the (unobservable)  agent's 
effort . 
Despite the limitations introduced by  the existence of  a restricted number of  states of 
nature, the paper also shows some interesting comparative static results and insights as to 
why those financial instruments are optimal. In a more recent paper, Diamond (1995) uses 
a similar framework, that is, a principal-agent  model with three states of  nature, to study 
the optimal compensation scheme to be offered by the principal to the agent. 
The paper proceeds as follows:  In section 2, the model is introduced and in  section 3, 
the first-best  solution is computed. In sections 4 and 5, respectively, the optimal contract is 
determined and the optimality of  debt and equity is shown. The conclusions are presented 
'For  a study of  some banking regulations using this framework, see Santos (1995). 
2Bester and Hellwig (1987) also use this principle in a principal-agent  model to show the optimality of 
debt and equity contracts.  However,  the model  presented here has two advantages:  It allows the use of 
convex programming theory and it produces closed-form  solutions. 
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2  The Model 
In the principal-agent  model presented here, there is an entrepreneur, the agent, who has an 
investment project but does not have the necessary funds to finance it. As a result, he must 
obtain these funds from a financier, the principal.  The moral hazard is generated by  the 
dependence of  the project's expected returns on the agent's effort, which is not observable 
by  the principal. 
The assumptions of  the model are: 
Assumption  1  The entrepreneur and the financier are both risk neutral.  The entrepreneur 
has no funds,  while  the opportunity cost  of  the financier's  capital, i, is exogenous to the 
model. 
Assumption 2  The project  has the fol2owing  characteristics: 
a  it requires an initial investment equal  to I  and  one period  Eater  it produces  the total 
return yi  with the probability p;, and 
a  the number of  possible  returns of  the project  is finite.  In particular,  I assume that it 
has only three possible  returns: 
YO < Y1 < y27 
where yo = 0, and y = {y,, y,). 
In this model, the probability  distribution  of  the project's  returns is  assumed  to be 
an endogenous variable because it depends on  the entrepreneur's  effort.  Moreover, I also 
assume that the entrepreneur incurs a cost for each level of  effort that he chooses. 
One way to model this situation would be to take the entrepreneur's  effort as the choice 
variable. In that case, it would be necessary to specify a functional relationship between the 
3 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9505.pdfprobabilities and the effort, and a cost function that would depend on the effort.  Instead, 
I use  a different  approach  wherein  the choice variables  are the probabilities  themselves. 
Because the entrepreneur incurs  a certain  cost for  each probability  distribution  that he 
chooses, in this approach the cost function  depends on  the probabilities (p,,p2) with the 
convention that p,  = 1 -  C:=!=,  p;.  The main  advantage of  this approach is that it avoids 
some of  the technical difficulties that frequently  appear when  solving a  principd-agent 
pr~blern.~  In  addition, the choice of  a cost function that is strictly  convex and strictly 
increasing in its arguments makes it possible to use convex programming theory in solving 
the model. 
Assumption 3  Let C(.) denote the cost function.  Then 
where  p  = {p,,p2), and  C(-) is C2, strictly  convex,  strictly  increasing  and  satisfies  the 
condition C(0) = 0. In particular, I use the following  cost function: 
A necessary condition to motivate the entrepreneur to choose a positive level of  effort 
in state 1 (p, > 0) is that y,  > 0, which is part of  assumption (1). However, with respect 
to state 2, due to the linear term included in the cost function, in order to motivate the 
entrepreneur to choose p,  > 0, it is necessary to assume the following: 
Assumption 4 
y2 -  a, > 0. 
,For  a discuskion of the advantages associated with this approach, see Holmstr6m (1979). 
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The first-best  outcome would  be the solution to the model presented here if  the financier 
could  observe the level  of  effort  chosen  by  the entrepreneur in  each  state, or  if  the en- 
trepreneur had enough funds to finance the project. In both cases, this outcome would be 
the solution to the following problem:4 
where e is a vector of  ones. 
Because the objective function is C2 and strictly concave in p, and the feasible set is 
convex and compact, we are in the presence of a convex programming problem. In this case, 
we  know  there is  a unique optimum and that the Kuhn-Tucker  conditions are necessary 
and sufficient for a solution. 
Given  that I am interested only in the situations where p,  > 0 (when there is some 
risk of  failure of  the project), this implies that the constraint to the first-best  problem is 
not binding and, as a result, the multiplier associated  with it is zero.5  In this case, from 
the Kuhn-Tucker  conditions one can immediately see that the first-best  outcome to this 
problem is 
4Note  that in the case where the entrepreneur gets the funds from the financier and his effort is observable, 
the first-best  outcome is the solution to that problem because I assume that both the entrepreneur and the 
financier have transferable utilities. As a result, it is possible to maximize the sum of their payoffs. 
51n order for this to be true, once the solution to this problem  (pib,pib)  has been found, it is necessary 
to impose a condition on the parameters of  the model such that pib +p;b < 1. 
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IIfb = --1(1  +  i), 
2 
where IIfb are the first-best  profits of the project, and H 
Assumptions  (1) and  (4) imply  that pfb > 0 and p,fb > 0.  However, since these are 
probabilities, it is also necessary  to make sure that their values are smaller than one.  In 
addition, because of the initial condition that the project's  probability of  failure is strictly 
greater than zero, it is also necessary to have pfb +  pib < 1. These new restrictions on the 
parameters of the model are summarized in the following assumption: 
Assumption 5 
Y1  < a1, 
Yz -  aa  < a27 
a1 (Y, -  a,) + a2y1  < a, a,. 
4  The Optimal Contract 
Suppose the entrepreneur does not have the necessary funds to undertake the project and 
that he will  obtain  them  from  a  financier.  Under  these  circumstances,  even  when  the 
principal and the agent are both risk neutral, the first-best  solution will  not be reached. 
The well-known  procedure that implements the first-best  solution in this class of  models- 
that is, the procedure whereby the principal demands a fixed payment and makes the agent 
the residual claimant-cannot  be implemented here because in state 0 the project's outcome 
is zero and by assumption this state of  nature occurs with a positive probability. 
The contract that will rule the relationship between the financier and the entrepreneur 
must specify three items: First, the number of  monetary units supplied by the financier to 
the entrepreneur at the beginning of  the period; second, the probability distribution to be 
chosen by the entrepreneur; and, finally, the division of the project's returns that will occur 
at the end of  the period. 
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between  the entrepreneur  and the financier  is independent of  the relative market power 
that each has in his own  sector.  However, the same does not happen with respect to the 
revenue raised  by  that contract.  Here,  there exists a  continuum of  possibilities limited 
by  the following two  extremes.  First, suppose that there are many  entrepreneurs with 
identical projects but only one financier.  In this case, the optimal contract will  define a 
division of  the returns that leaves to the entrepreneur only the absolute minimum needed 
to guarantee that he undertakes the project.  Second, imagine now  the opposite situation: 
perfect competition among the financiers.  In  this case, the optimal contract will give the 
financier only the required return to pay for the opportunity cost of  the capital supplied to 
the entrepreneur at the beginning of  the period. 
Let  T; be the payment required by the financier contingent on the return yi.  As a result 
of  the limited liability condition, we  have ro -  0 because by assumption yo G 0, and r; < y; 
for i = 1,2. Based on this definition, the contract between the two parties can be written as 
a triple (I,p,  r),  where I  is the number of monetary units supplied by the financier, p is the 
probability  distribution chosen by the entrepreneur, and T  is  the vector of  (non-negative) 
contingent payments made by the entrepreneur. 
The optimal contract that rules the relationship between  the two parties is defined as 
the solution to the problem that maximizes the profits of  the entrepreneur subject to the 
following constraints. The  first are the incentive constraints, which are used to motivate the 
entrepreneur to choose the probability distribution p given the payment schedule r defined 
in the ~ontract.~  The second is the participation constraint, which is used to guarantee that 
'Note  that even  though the contract specifies  a probability  distribution, p,  the entrepreneur  cannot 
be forced to choose it because the effort that he puts into the project, which determines the probability 
distribution, is not observable by  the financier.  Hence, it is through these constraints that the financier 
can find  the right incentive to give the entrepreneur in  order  to make him choose  (voluntarily) a certain 
probability distribution. 
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limited liability condition. 
Proposition 1 The optimal contract to the problem defined here is (I,p*,  r*), where 
Y1  Y2 -  a  Y  -a3 
P* = [ - (-  a1 t ) a2  f (A*)  a  1 f (A*) l-  a2  (A*)], 
H 
and IIF are the profits required by  the financier with  0 5 nF  _< -  -  f(1  + i). 
4 
The formal proof of  this proposition is in the appendix. 
Looking at the results of  this proposition, we  see that f (.) is a decreasing and strictly 
concave function of  nF  in the relevant interval.  As a result, when the profits required by 
the financier increase (suppose aF  increases at a constant rate): 
(a) the functional form of  the optimal contract does not change; 
(b)  the entrepreneur's payments to the financier in each state (r:,r:)  increase; 
(c) the probabilities of  the project's  positive outcomes (p:,p,*)  decrease, while its proba- 
bility of  failure (p,')  increases; 
(d) the entrepreneur's profits (11;)  decrease; 
(e) dl  the variations in these variables occur at an increasing rate. 
This process can continue until the point  equivalent  to the existence of  a monopoly in 
the financing sector. At that time, the financier gets the maximum amount of profits, which 
H 
is equal to fi~  = -  -  1(1+ i). 
4 
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the project would be undertaken if  H  > 21(1 $ i). However, proposition (1) requires H > 
41(1 + i) for the same project  to be financed by  an  outsider.  These conditions indicate 
that there is a set of  projects  that would  be undertaken in  the first-best  case, but that 
these projects will  not be financed by  an outside party.  This underinvestment  represents 
one of  the costs associated  with the second-best  outcome.  In terms of  the set of  projects 
that would  be undertaken in  both  situations, the results in proposition  (1) show that in 
the second-best  case, the probability of positive outcomes is always lower-that  is, there is 
a generalized decrease in the entrepreneur's effort when he gets the funds from an outside 
source.  This implies that in the second-best  outcome, the project's  probability  of  failure 
is always higher than in the first-best;  furthermore, this difference increases as the profits 
required by the financier rise. 
5  Debt and Equity as Optimal Contracts 
Using a spanning argument, this section shows that debt and equity are optimal contracts 
in the model adopted in this paper. In addition, it presents some comparative static results 
and an explanation for the optimality of  these financial instruments. 
Suppose the financier  decides to use debt and/or equity to finance the project.  Then 
the new  contract can be written as  a,  d), where I  and p have the same definition as 
before, a is the proportion of  the firm's equity held by the financier, (1-a) is the proportion 
of the firm's  equity held by the entrepreneur, and d is the face value of  debt borrowed by 
the entrepreneur. As usual, I assume that equityholders are the residual claimants and that 
they are protected by limited liability. 
In addition to assumptions (1) to (5),  I also assume that the constant marginal profits of 
the entrepreneur's effort before the payment to the financier are higher in state 2, (yz -  a3), 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9505.pdfthan in state 1, (y1).7 
Assumption 6 
Proposition 2  The optimal contract defined in  proposition (1) can be  replicated by a unique 
combination of  debt and  equity, that is, by the contract (I,  p*, a*,  d*),  where 
d*  = 
~3~1~* 
(~1  -  yZ)(l -  A*) + a,A*  ' 
and where p*  and A*  are equal to the values presented  in  proposition  (1). 
A  formal proof  of  this proposition  is contained  in the appendix.  It is based  on  the 
following spanning argument:  If  there exists a feasible  and unique combination  of  a  and 
d that motivates the entrepreneur to choose the second-best  outcome p*  and at the same 
time generates the same revenue to the bank as r*,  then it must be the case that debt and 
equity are optimal contracts in the model presented here. 
Before presenting the intuition for the optimality of  debt and equity, which will become 
more clear when I study how the optimal contract changes with variations in the assumptions 
of the model, I first present some comparative static results associated with proposition (2). 
Using the functional forms of both a* and d* and taking into consideration the fact that 
A*=A(yi, aj,  7,  TIF) with i = 1,2 and j  = 1,2,3, it is possible to show the following signs for 
the partial derivatives: 
a* =  ( yi, aj,  I,  TIF ),  -+++ 
'Note  that, besides the constant part  of the marginal profits of the entrepreneur's effort in each state 
of  nature, there is also the  marginal cost, which depends  on  the level  of effort he chooses-that  is, alpl 
and a2p2  for states 1 and 2, respectively.  All of these values are obtained through the differentiation of the 
entrepreneur's profits before the payments to the financier [ply,  +p2y2 -  C(p)]  with respect to PI  and pa 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9505.pdfThe explanation for the negative relation  between  the optimal value of  the financial 
instruments and the outcomes of  the project is that when  y;  increases, the financier gets 
more revenue through his participation in the equity of  the firm.  In addition, an increase 
in the outcomes of  the project motivates the entrepreneur to choose a higher level of effort, 
p:  and pz. As a result, it is possible for the financier to obtain the same expected profit, 
fiF,  by holding less equity and charging a lower face value of  debt. 
The justification  for  the positive  relation  between  the financial instruments  and the 
parameters  aj  is  that an increase in one of  these parameters  means an increase in the 
entrepreneur's cost of  effort, which implies a decrease in the level of effort that he chooses. 
Then, in order to get  the same expected level of  profits,  the financier must increase the 
revenue he collects both through his participation as an equityholder and through the face 
value of  debt he charges to the entrepreneur. 
Finally, in order to increase his profits, the financier increases both his participation in 
the firm's equity and the face value of debt. Furthermore, it is possible to show that as the 
profits required by the financier increase, the proportion of equity that he holds relative to 
the face value of debt decreases-that  is, 
This occurs because the level of  effort that the entrepreneur puts into the project is more 
sensitive to the proportion of equity he holds than to the face value of  debt he has to pay. 
Knowing this, when  the financier  wants to increase his profits, he increases the value of 
both financial instruments but increases the value of  debt more than equity. 
Let's  see now  what happens to the optimal contract when some variants of  the model 
are considered.  For example, suppose that assumption (6) is replaced by  y2 -  a, -  y, = 0. 
In this case, there would be no change to the optimal contract (I,p*,  r*).  However, now this 
contract can be replicated using only debt-that  is, through (I,  p*, dl), where 
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entrepreneur's effort before the payment  to the financier, (y, -  a, = y,), equity does not 
replicate  the optimal contract, because it does not  take into account the entrepreneur's 
effort cost in state 2, (a,).  If  equity were to be used here, since it would  be a percentage 
of  the project returns y,  and y,,  it would penalize the entrepreneur in state 2. As a result, 
he would choose a lower level of effort in this state. Because of the equality of  the constant 
marginal profits of  the entrepreneur's effort across states, the optimum outcome is reached 
by  making him pay  to the financier a value that is independent of  the project's  returns. 
That's why debt alone replicates the optimal contract in this example. 
Going back to the original model, suppose now that a, = 0 (the constant marginal cost 
of the entrepreneur's effort in state 2 is eliminated). In this case, the optimal contract would 
be determined by the results in proposition  (1) with a, = 0. It is possible to show that this 
contract can be replicated using only equity-that  is, through (I,  p*, a'), where 
with  A'  equal to A*  when a, = 0. 
Note that the constant marginal profits of  the entrepreneur's  effort  are now  higher in 
state 2 than in state 1 (y,  > y,).  In  this situation, debt  does not replicate the optimal 
contract because it does not  take into account  that difference.  As  a result, if  debt were 
used, it would  penalize  the entrepreneur in state 1, making him  choose a lower level of 
effort in this state. However, this problem is avoided if, instead, equity is used.  Since there 
are no constant  marginal  costs  (by  assumption  a,  = 0), this financial  instrument  alone 
replicates the optimal contract. 
From these two variants it becomes clear why  a combination of  debt and equity must 
be used in order to span the optimal contract in the initial model.  The debt component of 
the contract is explained by the constant marginal cost of  the entrepreneur's  effort in state 
2.  Its existence is necessary in order to avoid penalizing the entrepreneur relatively more 
12 
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by  the difference of the project returns across states. Its existence is important so that the 
entrepreneur is not relatively more penalized in state 1, which has a lower return. 
6  Conclusion 
This paper shows the simultaneous optimality of  debt and equity contracts by  using the 
following principle:  If  for some reason, such as technological constraints, it is possible to 
reduce all of  the variables  (actions) that the manager can control to a space of  dimension 
two then, in general, it will be possible to implement the second-best  outcome through a 
combination of two financial instruments. This principle is incorporated in a principal-agent 
model where the agent has an investment project that produces an outcome in three states 
of nat~re.~  The return on this investment in each state depends on the (unobservable) effort 
chosen by the agent. 
After deriving the optimal contract that the principal uses to finance the agent, I show 
that this contract can be spanned by a unique combination of debt and equity. The debt part 
of the contract is explained by the agent's (constant) cost of effort that affects the project's 
return in one of  the states, while the equity component is explained by the difference of the 
return of  the agent's effort across states of  nature. 
'For  some interesting results about optimal compensation schemes in a similar framework, see Diamond 
(1995). 
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A.l  Proof of Proposition 1 
In order to prove this proposition, it is necessary to solve a principal-agent  problem, which 
I do using a two-step  pro~edure.~  In  the first step, the incentive constraints are deter- 
mined.  In  the second step, the profits of  the entrepreneur are maximized  over the set of 
implementable choices of  p. 
A.l.l  First Step-The  Entrepreneur's Problem 
For a given payment schedule F,  the entrepreneur must solve the following problem: 
Because the objective function is strictly  concave and  the feasible set is convex and 
compact,  this is a  convex programming problem  with  a  unique solution.  Moreover,  the 
Kuhn-Tucker  conditions are necessary and sufficient for a solution.  Once again, I assume 
that the parameters of  the model are such that p,,  > 0. 
Taking into account the Kuhn-Tucker  conditions and the existence of  limited liability, 
it is possible to conclude that 
(a)  If  F, < y,, then p, > 0, and if 6  = y,, then p, = 0. 
(b) If 6  < y2 -  a,,  then p2 > 0, and if  y2 -  a, 5 .L', 5 y2, then p2 = 0. 
'This  procedure,  which is known in the literature  as the  "first-order  approach" to the principal-agent 
problem, is not valid in certain cases.  See, for example, Mirrlees (1975).  However,  there  are other cases 
where it is valid; for example, Rogerson (1985) and Jewitt  (1988). In the present example, as I will  argue, 
the first-order  approach works without any problem. 
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and y, -  a, 5 r, < y2  because these choices will generate no revenue for him.  As a result, 
the incentive constraints for the case where p, +  p2 < 1 are 
Given  that  there is  a one-to-one  relation  between  r1 and p,  on  the one hand,  and 
between  r, and p2  on  the other hand, then  all  the relevant probability  distributions can 
be generated by  the contracts that satisfy  the incentive constraints.  As  a result, when 
solving the present model, it is sufficient to consider the set of  contracts that satisfies these 
constraints. 
A.1.2  Second Step-The  Financier's Problem 
In this step, the entrepreneur's profits are maximized over the set of  implementable choices 
of p. This set is defined by  the incentive constraints, the financier's participation constraint, 
and the limited liability  condition.  The idea behind  this  step is  that given  the profits 
required by financiers, fl,,  they compete in order to offer the best feasible contract to the 
entrepreneur. The problem that a financier must solve can be formalized as follows: 
s.t.  y,  -r,-alpl  =O 
y2 -  a3 -  r, -  a2p2  = 0 
PITI +  p2r2 -  f(1 + i) 2 nF 
O<r;<y;  for  i=1,2. 
Note that by changing the profits required by the financier in the participation constraint 
(between zero, which occurs when there is perfect competition to  finance the project, and the 
H 
maximum amount of profits that he can get, [-  -  f(l  + i)] ,  which occurs when there is only 
4 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9505.pdfone financier and many identical entrepreneurs), it is possible to find all of  the admissible 
divisions of  the project's returns between the entrepreneur and the financier, and all of  the 
efficient contracts. In the process of  finding all of  these divisions, it is necessary to ensure 
that the entrepreneur's  profits  are sufficient to cover his opportunity cost of  undertaking 
the project, which I assume to be zero.1°  Furthermore, since the incentive constraints were 
derived under the assumption that pi > 0 for i = 0,1,2, then the solution to the problem 
presented here must satisfy these initial conditions. 
To solve this problem, I use two simplifications.  First, I use the one-to-one  relation 
that exists between  ri  and pi in  the incentive constraints in order to rewrite the problem 
as a function of pi.  Second, it is clear that the financier's participation constraint  will  be 
verified exactly.  If  not, the entrepreneur's  profits  could  be increased  simply  by  offering 
him  a new  contract with  a lower  ri.  Therefore, I can  "add"  the financier's  participation 
constraint  to the objective function without  altering the solution  to the problem.  Using 
these simplifications, I can write the problem as 
Max  nE  = p1  y1 +  p2  y2 -  C(p) -  1(1+ i) -  nF 
P 
s.t.  P](Y~  -  alpl) +  p2(y2 -  a3 -  a2p2)  -  T(1 + i) 2 nF 
P>  0. 
Given that the objective function is strictly concave and the feasible set is compact and 
convex (the constraint is strictly concave), then we  are again in the presence of  a convex 
programming problem and the usual results apply.  Defining  X as the Lagrange multiplier, 
it is possible to argue that its value is strictly smaller than zero, in which case the solution 
''In  this step, it would  have  been  possible  to formalize the following different problem:  Maximize the 
financier's  profits subject to the entrepreneur's incentive constraints, the limited liability condition,  and 
a  constraint that would  consider  the profits  required  by  the entrepreneur.  In  this case,  the set of  all 
possible divisions.of the project returns would be obtained by  changing the amount of  profits required by 
the entrepreneur between its minimum, which occurs when there is a monopolist financier, and its maximum, 
which occurs when there is perfect competition among the financiers. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9505.pdfto the present problem is the result in proposition (I), and all of  the initial conditions that 
were assumed (pi > 0 for i = 0,1,2) are verified.'' 
A.2  Proof of Proposition 2 
A.2.1  First Step-The  Entrepreneur's Problem 
For a given percentage of  equity held by the financier, 6, and a given face value of  debt, d, 
the entrepreneur must solve the following problem: 
Once again, this is a convex programming problem, so the usual results apply.  For the 
case where p;  > 0 for i = 0,1,2 the incentive constraints are 
A.2.2  Second Step-The  Financier's  Problem 
Instead of  defining the equivalent to the problem characterized in this step in the previous 
proof and showirig that its solution is the result of  proposition (2), I use a different approach 
here based on a spanning argument. The idea is as follows: If it is possible to find a feasible 
combination of a and d that motivates the entrepreneur, through the incentive constraints, 
llImplicit  here is the following Lagrangean: 
where X 5 0. If  X =  0 we  would have the first-best  solution but the constraint to this problem  would not be 
verified.  As a result, we  need to have X < 0. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9505.pdfto choose the probability distribution p*, then the initial conditions are verified-that  is, 
p;  > 0 for  i = 0,1,2. In addition, if  such a combination generates the same revenue to the 
financier as r* does, then it must be the solution to the financier's problem and, as a result, 
it is proven that the optimal contract can be spanned by a combination of  debt and equity. 
From the incentive constraints and the second-best  probability  distribution p*, I find 
a*  and d*, the values  that the financier would have to choose in order to implement  p*. 
Since these values satisfy the initial conditions that I have assumed, the last thing left to 
be proved is that the combination  (a*,d*)  generates the same revenue to the financier as 
r* does.  This is apparent immediately once the following definitions are considered: 
which finishes the proof of  proposition  (2). 
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